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ABSTRACT

The launch of liquified natural gas futures in May of 2017 on a major exchange follows a
dramatic increase in global demand for the energy source. The profit of firms that produce LNG,
known as transformers, is driven by the spread between the price of natural gas and LNG. With
the launch of LNG futures, transformers now have the ability to hedge their exposure to this spread,
similar to oil refiners hedging the crack spread. This paper proposes three hedging strategies
transformers can utilize to limit their exposure to natural gas and LNG price movements. Using
second-order lower partial moments (LPM 2 ) as a measure for hedging effectiveness, this paper
will show that transformers who do not hedge their exposure to the spread perform better than
those who employ any of the proposed strategies, a result driven in part by 2017 market conditions.

Keywords: Natural gas, LNG, commodity hedging.
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INTRODUCTION

While LNG has existed as an energy source for over 70 years, it has not been widely used
as the costs inherit in producing it were prohibitive. However, recent technological advancements
and depressed natural gas prices have made LNG a viable global energy source. The launch of
LNG futures contracts on the Intercontinental Exchange give transformers the ability to hedge
their exposure to LNG price volatility using exchange traded financial instruments for the first
time. Drawing on the crack spread for inspiration, this paper proposes three hedging strategies that
take into account production time and the various inputs/outputs associated with the transformation
of natural gas into LNG. This study utilizes LPM 2 to measure hedging effectiveness as, unlike the
more commonly used minimum variance statistic, it only penalizes downside deviations of a
hedging strategy. Thus, LPM 2 better captures the risk profile of transformers who prefer hedging
strategies that are allowed to deviate from market prices if it means an increase in profit. While
the results of this paper are limited by the available data, it discusses the necessary framework in
depth required to analyze the relatively new LNG industry for future researchers.
Natural Gas Overview
Natural gas is a fossil fuel used mostly to generate electricity, produce various chemical
products, and to heat homes. The price of natural gas is quoted per million British thermal units
(MMBtu), with a single Btu defined as the amount of energy required to heat one pound of water
by one degree Fahrenheit. In the United States, the natural gas benchmark price is quoted from the
Henry Hub, a distribution center in Louisiana. Natural gas prices across the United States are
conventionally quoted by a spread above or below the price at the Henry Hub. The fossil fuel
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currently accounts for approximately 24% of the world’s total energy consumption, a figure that
stood at 16% in 1973 (BP, 2016).
Natural gas can be categorized as either wet or dry depending on its composition. Dry gas
is primarily composed of methane while wet gas is made up of compounds such as ethane and
propane in addition to methane. These additional compounds are known as natural gas liquids
(NGLs) and when wet natural gas is treated, the compounds can be separated and sold
commercially. As natural gas prices have reached historic lows recently, wet gas is considered
more valuable than dry gas because NGLs can be sold at a higher price per MMBtu than natural
gas. Wet natural gas is generally found in shale formations, the target of frackers drilling for crude
oil. Wet gas is composed of roughly 80% methane, with ethane and propane making up the vast
majority of the remaining percentage. For comparison, processed natural gas is approximately 90%
methane and 10% ethane (NAESB, 2003). In 2017, the U.S. produced 28.8 trillion cubic feet of
wet gas, which directly resulted in the production of 952.6 million barrels of ethane and propane
(EIA, 2018).
The growth of natural gas as a global energy source is driven primarily by two factors.
First, it is considered the cleanest of all fossil fuels, especially compared to the closest comparable
fossil fuel used to generate power, coal. This has become particularly important as countries
around the world seek to reduce their carbon emissions and improve air quality. The second factor
that helps to explain natural gas’s growth is price. Natural gas is significantly cheaper than coal
with respects to energy production. According to a report from Lazard, in 2017 the estimated
levelized cost of one megawatt hour (mWh) of electricity generated by coal costs $102. In
comparison, one mWh generated by natural gas costs just $60 (Ailworth, 2017). The advent of
fracking has driven natural gas prices to historic lows as natural gas is released as a byproduct of
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the drilling technique. Fracking has brought what were once previously inaccessible natural gas
reserves to the market.
The infrastructure required to transport natural gas has long been its greatest drawback.
Natural gas can only be used in locations that are connected to a pipeline, a problem particularly
relevant for countries without their own natural gas reserves and without pipeline infrastructure
(e.g. Japan). Such countries have needed to rely on renewables or coal, which can easily be shipped
around the world, to generate power. However, recent technological developments have made
LNG a viable option for countries who find themselves unable to import natural gas.
The Development of LNG
LNG is produced by cooling natural gas to -260°F, the temperature at which natural gas
exists as a liquid. It is then loaded onto specialized cargo ships and sent to its destination port,
where it is regasified and delivered to its final destination via natural gas pipelines. Firms that
produce and regasify LNG are known as transformers, the equivalent of oil refiners for LNG. The
ability to liquify natural gas has the clear benefit of providing natural gas to countries who
previously had no access to the energy source. In addition, transporting natural gas in its liquified
form results in less carbon emissions than traditional pipeline transportation, furthering the energy
source’s reputation as the cleanest fossil fuel available (IGU, 2015).
However, the costs associated with transforming LNG are significant. Terminals that
transform natural gas to LNG must be built on ports that can be accessed by tankers and require
significant investment to construct, generally over $1 billion. Furthermore, LNG can only be
shipped on certain specially equipped tankers, that cost a minimum of $300 million to build. LNG
must be shipped to ports with regassification capabilities, which also require significant
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investment. In addition, because LNG must be cooled and stored at -260°F utility costs are
significant, representing 20% of all operational costs of an LNG terminal (Carroll, 2017).
However technological improvements coupled with growing global demand for natural gas
has made LNG a viable energy source despite the costs associated with it. These market conditions
have led to a number of developments within the LNG market. In February of 2017, China signed
a deal with the United States to import 1.2 million tons of LNG per year from 2023 to 2043
(Matthews, 2018). Currently, there are three active LNG export terminals in the U.S., with the
Sabine Pass facility in Louisiana accounting for 75% of total liquefication capacities and is not yet
fully operational. Five other LNG export terminals are currently under construction with four more
sites recently being approved by regulators. The total capacity of all projects either under
construction or approved would increase the U.S. output to 401.8 million tons per annum (mtpa),
dwarfing current U.S. production of 9 mtpa (Carroll, 2017).
Perhaps the most significant development in the LNG market for purposes of this paper is
the launch of LNG futures contracts. On May 4, 2017, the Intercontinental Exchange launched the
first ever LNG futures contract benchmarked to the Gulf Coast price of LNG in the U.S. The
launch of an LNG futures contract now allows firms to hedge their risk to LNG price movements
they could only previously do with the use of forward contracts. The liquid nature of futures
contracts also allows commodity traders to take positions in LNG that were once impossible. But
most importantly, it allows transformers to hedge their exposure to the difference between the
price of natural gas and LNG, much like refiners do with oil and its refined products.
The Crack Spread
Cracking is the process in which the carbon-carbon bonds of complex organic molecules
are broken to create simpler molecules (Alfke et al., 2007). This is the process refiners use to
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transform crude oil into its refined products such as gasoline, heating oil, and jet fuel. The
difference between the price of crude oil and the price of its refined products is thus known as the
crack spread. In the United States, the crack spread is calculated as follows:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 =

2 × 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − 3 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
3

(1)

Where each variable represents the price per barrel of the following commodities:
RB = RBOB Gasoline
HO = New York Harbor ULSD Heating Oil
CL = WTI Crude Oil
The proportions are meant to mimic the approximate output of three barrels of light, sweet crude
oil as it passes through a refiner. In other words, for every three barrels of light, sweet crude oil
that is cracked, a refiner produces roughly one barrel of heating oil and two barrels of gasoline,
which is why the crack spread is frequently referred to as the “3:2:1.” There are a number of
variations on the crack spread, such as the 5:3:2 and the 1:1 (which is just the difference in price
between gasoline and crude oil), but the most commonly quoted crack spread is the 3:2:1 (EIA,
2013).
The ability to hedge the crack spread using futures contracts is of particular importance to
oil refiners. Unlike drillers and airlines, who are only impacted by movements on one side of the
crack spread, refiners face the challenge of being impacted by both. By definition, a refiner’s
profitability is driven by the difference between the price it can sell oil’s refined products for and
the cost of purchasing crude oil to refine, i.e. the crack spread. Refiner’s demand for protection
from crack spread volatility has made the bundle of futures contracts that make it up one of the
most commonly traded combinations in the world (Liu, et al., 2017). With the launch of LNG
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futures, natural gas transformers who face the same problem as refiners, can now hedge their
exposure to the natural gas equivalent of the crack spread.

RESEARCH QUESTION

With the introduction of ICE’s LNG futures contract in May 2017 came the opportunity
for natural gas transformers to hedge their exposure to the spread between natural gas and LNG
prices using exchange traded securities. The most relevant research question for transformers asks
what is the most effective way to hedge the difference in prices of natural gas and LNG? However,
this question is beyond the scope of this paper due to the advanced technical nature of the topic
and the resources needed to fully address it. Instead, this paper proposes three different
combinations of futures contracts meant to mimic this spread and asks of these hedging strategies,
which one most effectively hedges transformer’s risk to the natural gas-LNG spread?
Luckily, one question that does not need further research is what to call this difference in
prices? While natural gas is not cracked, it does need to be cooled to -260°F to be converted to
LNG. Thus, the difference in prices between LNG and natural gas will be referred to as the cool
spread throughout the paper (Huemmler, 2017).

SIGNFICANCE

If the crack spread’s importance to the oil industry is any indicator, the cool spread has the
potential to become a commonly accepted indicator of market conditions for both natural gas and
LNG, especially if the forecasted growth of global demand for LNG materializes. Effective
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hedging of the cool spread will be of particular significance to transformers, institutional market
makers, and commodity traders. These three groups are discussed below.
Transformers
The cool spread is a key driver of transformer’s operating margin, much in the same way
the crack spread is for oil refiners. Transformers have a vested interest in securing a stable
operating margin, which can be accomplished through efficient cool spread hedging. This allows
transformers to focus on issues they can control, optimization of export terminals, and insulate
them from those issues they cannot, global commodity prices. As more export terminals are
approved by regulators and begin operations, the demand for financial instruments to hedge the
cool spread will increase.
Market Makers
Transformers will not enter into futures contracts independently, they will most likely
purchase the instruments through a financial intermediary, such as a market maker. Large financial
institutions such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley compete for fees that come with advising
clients in complex financial situations, such as what transformers face in determining their hedging
strategy. Naturally, these market makers will have an interest in designing efficient hedging
strategies to attract and keep transformers as clients. Knowing what bundle of futures best insulates
transformers from volatility in the cool spread will be crucial to attracting them as clients.
Commodity Traders
The development of the cool spread will provide new opportunities for speculation, which
makes the bundles of futures contracts that make it up of particular interest to day traders. While
these traders will not have any interest in the rationale behind the use of certain financial
instruments to hedge the cool spread, they will care what contracts transformers decide to use.
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Traders will want to position themselves to take advantage of the increased trading volume and
open interest, a position that will be dictated by the futures transformers use to execute their hedge.
Day traders commonly position themselves to take advantage of movements in the crack spread
and there is no indication that the cool spread would be any different, especially considering natural
gas futures are the second most traded energy commodity on the CME.

LITERATURE REVIEW

As this paper seeks to compare the effectiveness of various hedging strategies revolving
around natural gas and LNG futures, relevant literature includes LNG market dynamics,
established natural gas hedging strategies, and hedging efficiency measurements. These three
topics are discussed below.
LNG Market
Fifteen years ago, the LNG market was dominated by rigid long-term contracts between
governments, especially in Asia. Suppliers used rigid such contracts with significant price
premiums and take-or-pay clauses to guarantee financing for LNG terminals. End consumers were
willing to take on contracts with such unfavorable terms in order to guarantee a supply of natural
gas (Choi, Heo, 2017). Due to the rigid nature of these contracts LNG tankers were referred to as
floating pipelines to reflect the economic reality that such contracts mirrored pipeline contracts for
natural gas, which notoriously lack flexibility (Ponce, Krone, 2014). The lack of a benchmark
natural gas price in Asia meant the price of LNG was often tied to the price of crude oil (Stern,
2012).
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The desire for energy independence, driven by European tensions with Russia, one of the
world’s largest natural gas suppliers, coupled with stricter global emissions standards have driven
the construction of new LNG terminals in the Baltic States (Serry, 2017). As these European
terminals have gone online, Asia’s largest LNG supplier, Qatar, has begun to export LNG to
Europe. The result is LNG prices in Asia are increasingly tied to demand for natural gas in Europe,
and thus tied to European benchmark natural gas prices (Rozmarynowska, 2012). As the U.S.
continues to expand its LNG production capabilities, the market for LNG more closely resembles
that of the oil market instead of a floating pipeline (Bernstein et al., 2016).
Natural Gas Hedging
The use of natural gas futures to hedge exposure to fluctuations in the underlying’s spot
price is not as effective as other energy futures such as oil, gasoline, and heating oil. This effect is
magnified during low probability tail events, such as particularly severe hurricanes. This
inefficiency is driven by natural gas’s limited export capabilities in comparison to other energy
sources and difficulties in storage and transport (Hanly, 2017). Pipeline infrastructure in the United
States suffers from regional segmentation, a problem other energy sources do not have as they can
be transported via rail and trucks. Due to the reliance on pipelines, regional natural gas prices vary
dramatically because of the transport capacity of each pipeline and abnormal transportation pricing
(e.g. it may be cheaper to transport natural gas between two primary hubs that are considerable
distance apart compared to two secondary hubs that are much closer together). As a result, natural
gas futures can hedge movements in spot prices more effectively for regions connected via pipeline
infrastructure to the Henry Hub, such as the East Coast, Midwest, and Southeast compared to those
regions that are not, the Rockies and West Coast (Brinkman, Rabinovich, 1995).
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However, recent studies have suggested strategies that the use of natural gas futures to
hedge changes in spot prices can be made more efficient. For example, adjusting hedging ratios to
account for seasonal fluctuations in the natural gas market can improve hedging effectiveness. This
fact holds true regardless of the length of the hedging period (Martinez, Torro, 2015). The hedging
effectiveness of natural gas futures can be further improved using a non-matching hedging strategy
that varies the maturity of natural gas futures beyond the hedging horizon (Ghoddusi,
Emamzadehfard, 2017). In addition, improved pipeline infrastructure coupled with the existence
of natural gas basis swaps contracts has resulted in regional spot prices in California moving in
tandem with spot prices at the Henry Hub (Woo et al., 2006).
Efficient Hedging
Conventional wisdom suggests that minimum variance is an appropriate measure of
hedging effectiveness in energy markets due to the volatile nature of energy prices and ease of use
when estimating hedge ratios (Alexander et al., 2013). However, observed hedge ratios often differ
significantly from the efficient hedge ratios implied by minimum variance calculations, suggesting
minimum variance calculations do not accurately reflect hedgers underlying concerns (Collins,
1997; Egeland et al., 2013). Recent research suggests that in scenarios that require multicommodity hedging, the use of minimum variance hedging offers no meaningful reduction in risk
criterion (Alexander et al., 2013). When LPM 2 is used to calculate optimal hedging ratios in multicommodity scenarios hedging ratios are smaller than those computed by minimum variance
(Power, Vedenov, 2009). Numerous researchers have proposed using second-order lower partial
moments (LPM 2 ) instead of minimum variance to measure hedging effectiveness (Liu et al., 2017;
Collins, 2000; Unsher, 2000). Thus, LPM 2 more accurately measures the risk profile of certain
commodity hedgers, such as refiners, who are only concerned with downside protection (Liu et
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al., 2017). Furthermore, LPM 2 is calculated using a given reference level (e.g. expected profits
without hedging) which allows for flexibility to adjust for a hedgers risk profile (Mattos et al.,
2008).

METHODOLOGY

The methodology for this paper can be divided into three steps. It begins with designing
multiple combinations of futures meant to mimic the cool spread. The next step becomes collecting
all relevant price information for these bundles to determine the profitability of each hedging
strategy. Finally, this paper calculates and compares the LPM 2 of each hedging strategy as a proxy
for hedging effectiveness, with the average profit earned without hedging over the period in
question serving as the reference level in the calculation of LPM 2 .
Designing Hedging Bundles
This paper draws on commonly traded futures bundles that mimic the crack spread for
inspiration in designing hedging strategies meant to insulate LNG transformers from price
movement in the cool spread. When deciding what securities to incorporate in each hedging
bundle, this paper only considers futures contracts. The price visibility and low transaction costs
associated with futures contracts makes the securities an attractive option for any hedging scenario.
Thus all proposed bundles will exclusively utilize futures as a financial instrument for hedging.
Only when the data for a pertinent futures contract is unavailable will other financial instruments
be considered. The factors to consider in each hedging strategy are limited to the underlying asset
of the futures contract, the position in the futures contract (i.e. long or short), the quantity of futures
contracts bought or sold, and the maturity of the contracts. When considering which underlying
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assets to use in a hedging strategy, this paper considers the inputs required for producing LNG and
the composition of the natural gas being liquefied, which affects the byproducts of liquefaction
and treatment. Whether a given commodity is an input or output with respects to LNG production
will determine the long or short position in the corresponding futures contract for all hedging
strategies. Long positions will represent inputs and short positions will represent outputs. The
number of contracts bought or sold will be based on quantities of inputs needed and outputs
generated from the liquefaction process. The ratio of contracts entered into for a given strategy
will be referred to as the hedging ratio, h.
Once the strategies are designed, the paper will calculate the profit π(h) for each hedging
bundle using historical price data. The spot price, S, future price, F, at the beginning of the hedge
timeline, t=0, and end, t=1, of every commodity represented in the hedging strategies will be used
in conjunction with the chosen hedge ratio, to compute the profit of the hedging strategy over the
period of analysis. For example, using this framework the profit earned from hedging the crack
spread with the 3:2:1 over a given period can be stated as:
1
1
2
2
𝜋𝜋(ℎ3:2:1 ) = 𝑆𝑆1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 + 𝑆𝑆1𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − 𝑆𝑆0𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 + (𝐹𝐹1𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 − 𝐹𝐹0𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 ) + (𝐹𝐹0𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 − 𝐹𝐹1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 ) + (𝐹𝐹0𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − 𝐹𝐹1𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 )
3
3
3
3

(2)

2

With the coefficient of each term representing that commodities hedge ratio (i.e. hGAS=3). The
hedging ratio of each bundle this paper proposes is fixed. In reality, this is not always the case,

however all commonly utilized crack spread hedges employ a fixed hedge ratio and this paper
utilizes that framework to simplify the analysis (Liu et al., 2017). The following trading strategies
will serve as the basis for comparison in this paper.
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Naked (No Hedging)
This will be the base case, with the average profit earned from a naked position serving as the
reference level when calculating the LPM 2 of the hedging bundles listed below. Profit earned from
naked hedging will be defined as:
𝜋𝜋(ℎ0 ) = 𝑆𝑆1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑆𝑆0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁

(3)

Note that this differs from the cool spread in that it takes into account the hedging timeline, which
is discussed in more detail below. The cool spread is calculated using spot price data when t 0 =t 1 .
Naïve Hedge (The 1:1)
A naïve hedge refers to any situation in which a hedger uses derivative instruments with the same
underlying asset as the asset being hedged. The hedging ratio is set to equal the exposure of the
hedger to the asset in question. Naïve hedging is a commonly employed strategy to hedge the crack
spread, with hedgers purchasing one crude oil future for every gasoline future they short. A naïve
hedge with respects to the cool spread is quite similar to its crack spread equivalent, with hLNG
=hNG = 1. Profit earned from the naïve hedge position is as follows:
𝜋𝜋(ℎ𝑛𝑛 ) = 𝑆𝑆1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑆𝑆0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + (𝐹𝐹1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 − 𝐹𝐹0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) + (𝐹𝐹0𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 )

(4)

NGL Hedge
The NGL hedge will assume the natural gas being liquefied is wet, thus resulting in the production
of NGLs while the wet gas is treated before liquefication. Using wet gas production data from the
U.S. Department of Energy and natural gas chemical composition data from the National American
16

3

Energy Standards Board, the hedging ratio will be set as hLNG =20; hNG =1; hETH =hPRP = 20. The
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calculations of these ratios can be found in Appendix A. Profit earned from the NGL hedge
position is as follows
𝜋𝜋(ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) =

16 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
3 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
3
16 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑆𝑆1 +
𝑆𝑆1 + 𝑆𝑆1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝑆𝑆0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + (𝐹𝐹1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 − 𝐹𝐹0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) +
(𝐹𝐹
− 𝐹𝐹1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 )
20
20
20
20 0
+

3
3
(𝐹𝐹0𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 − 𝐹𝐹1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ) + (𝐹𝐹0𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝐹𝐹1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 )
20
20

(5)

Power Hedge
This hedge adds electricity futures contracts as an input to the naïve hedge strategy outlined above.
Utility costs associated with power represent a large proportion of the total cost of production of
LNG. Based on academic literature related to the electricity costs associated with LNG, this paper
assumes 400 kilowatt hours (kWh) are required to produce one ton of LNG (Dhameliya, Agrawal,
2016). Converting kWh/ton to mWh/MMBtu leads to a hedge ratio of hLNG =hNG = 1; hELC=
Profit earned from the naïve hedge with electricity is as follows:
𝜋𝜋(ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ) = 𝑆𝑆1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑆𝑆0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 −

2

.

250

2 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
2
𝑆𝑆0 + (𝐹𝐹1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 − 𝐹𝐹0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) + (𝐹𝐹0𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐹𝐹1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ) +
(𝐹𝐹 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 − 𝐹𝐹0𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 )
250 1
250

(6)

The hedging ratio of electricity futures being so close to zero reflects the convention of quoting
electricity futures in dollars per mWh, a measurement of power much larger than the heat energy
measurement equivalent used in quoting natural gas prices.
Data
Expected profit calculations of the aforementioned hedging bundles require spot and future
price data of all aforementioned commodities. The period this paper examines begins May 4th,
2017, when ICE launched its LNG futures contract, to May 2, 2018. The source of the price data
for these variables is as follows:
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•

Natural Gas Spot Price- Henry Hub daily prices

•

Liquefied Natural Gas Spot Price- North Asian Singapore Exchange Limited LNG Index
Group (SLING). The Sling is an index that estimates LNG spot prices in China, Korea,
Japan, and Taiwan by polling asking participants in the Asian LNG market (brokers,
transformers, buyers, etc.) what they believe is a “fair price” for LNG in the
aforementioned countries. The Sling is calculated every Monday and Thursday and is
calculated using a similar methodology as LIBOR (EMC, 2017)

•

Propane Spot Price- North American Spot LPG Price/Mont Belvieu. Mont Belvieu is home
to Lone Star Gas’s storage facility and functions as the U.S. benchmark for propane prices

•

Ethane Spot- NYMEX Mont Belvieu Ethane 5 Decimal (OPIS) Swap

•

MISO Spot- Midwest ISO Indiana Hub Hourly Day Ahead Off-Peak Averages. MISO
refers to the Independent System Operator that provides power to much of the Midwest
and certain Southern states. It is headquartered in Indiana

•

Natural Gas Futures- NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas

•

Liquefied Natural Gas Futures- LNG Japan/Korea Marker (Platts) Swap

•

Propane Futures- NYMEX Mont Belvieu LDH Propane

•

Ethane Future- North American Purity Ethane Spot Price/Mont Belvieu non-LST

•

MISO Future- NFX MISO Indiana Hub Real-Time Off-Peak Financial Futures

All price data was downloaded from a Bloomberg terminal with the exception of Henry Hub
natural gas spot prices, which is from the EIA.
The use of the aforementioned price sources was driven in part by design and in part by
necessity. The decision to source all natural gas price data from the Henry Hub in all hedging
strategies reflects its importance as a global benchmark for U.S. natural gas and its proximity to
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the Sabine Pass, the largest operational LNG export terminal in the U.S. The study utilizes MISO
futures contracts for power because the Sabine Pass is located in the region served by MISO. The
use of Asian LNG prices is driven more out of necessity. The only resource available to Wharton
students that has any data on LNG pricing is Bloomberg, which only quotes Asian spot and futures
prices. S&P Global Platts publishes global daily LNG price data (the NYMEX LNG swap used as
a proxy for a future uses Platts to price the underlying LNG), but it is not available to retail
investors or researchers. However, the use of Asian LNG price data is not necessarily an inaccurate
situation. In 2017, roughly half of all LNG the U.S. exported was sent to Asia. The decoupling of
Henry Hub natural gas and crude oil prices, to which LNG prices are indexed to in Asia, has driven
demand for U.S. LNG to record highs. In 2016 the U.S. exported approximately 150 million cubic
feet of LNG per day to Asia. In 2017 that figure reached 900 million, reflecting the attractiveness
of U.S. LNG to Asian consumers. Furthermore, the U.S. sells 60% of its LNG on the spot market.
Even most of the U.S.’s long-term LNG contracts contain clauses that allow the LNG to be
rerouted anywhere in the world under certain conditions (EIA, 2018). Thus, the use of Asian spot
prices in calculating transformer profits is representative of current market conditions.
Hedging Timeline
In order to accurately reflect the situation a U.S. transformer faces given the available data,
the hedging timeline will reflect the transportation time of natural gas from the Permian Basin to
the Sabine Pass and then to Asia. The result is a hedging timeline of three weeks, based on the
following calculations. Assuming the transformer’s facility is the Sabine Pass, based on the
significant percentage it contributes to total U.S. LNG exports, and the natural gas feedstock used
originates in the Permian Basin, based on the natural gas production data and pipeline
infrastructure, the natural gas will travel approximately 500 miles before reaching the Sabine Pass.
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Natural gas travels through pipelines at speeds ranging from 10-20 mph depending on the
proximity of the nearest compressor station along the pipeline (INGAA, 2018). Assuming a
constant rate of 15 mph, it will take the natural gas approximately one day to arrive at the Sabine
Pass after it has been purchased.
Very little literature exists with respects to the time needed to transform natural gas into
LNG. However, there is data that discusses the amount of time needed to load LNG onto carries,
which can take up to an entire day. This paper makes the simplifying assumption that the Sabine
Pass is not capacity constrained such that once the feedstock natural gas arrives at the terminal it
is liquefied and loaded onto a carrier within one day.
As soon as the LNG is loaded onto a carrier, the paper assumes it is transported to an Asian
port based on U.S. export data and publicly available price information. For simplicity, Tokyo is
used as the final destination for the LNG due to the country’s growing demand for U.S. LNG and
the paper’s use of Japanese LNG swap contracts. Estimates from the Oxford Institute of Energy
Studies show LNG carriers can travel at 19 knots, regardless of whether they use a steam turbine
or dual fuel diesel electric propulsion system (Rodgers, 2018). Tokyo is 9,200 nautical miles from
the Sabine Pass, a journey that would last 20 days at speeds of 19 knots. Upon arrival, the LNG
would be sold on the spot market in Tokyo.
In aggregation, this scenario assumes that after natural gas feedstock has been purchased
by a transformer, it will be sold as LNG 22 days later, representing the hedging timeline. This
paper uses a hedging timeline of 21 days, or three weeks, to simplify the trading dates. In summary,
when calculating hedging strategy profits, t=0 corresponds to the date natural gas feedstock is
purchased and t=1 corresponds to the date three weeks later. The transformer would enter into a
short futures position for all outputs and a long futures position for all inputs at t=0. At t=1, the
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transformer would cover its short positions and exit the long position. At no point would the
transformer ever take delivery of the underlying commodity.
Active Trading Month
With the three-week hedging timeline in mind, the next consideration becomes what month
to trade of each futures contract. Generally speaking, the prompt month is also the active month in
futures trading. As such, this paper uses the prompt month with respects to the actual dates in the
three-week hedging timeline. While the various futures contracts employed have differing last
days of trading, NYMEX Henry Hub futures cease trading the earliest in the month of all relevant
futures contracts at three trading days before first trading day of the delivery month. For example,
June 2018 NYMEX Henry Hub futures stop trading on May 29th, 2018, three trading days before
June 1st. To ensure margin requirements do not become burdensome and the prompt month
contract remains liquid, this paper switches trading months three days before the natural gas futures
cease trading. This practice is in line with crack spread trading, where hedgers and speculators
alike cease trading the crack spread of a given month anywhere from seven to three trading days
before the contract officially ceases trading. To continue the above example, June trading of the
cool spread would cease on May 24th, three trading days before the contract expires. Here May
24th would represent t=1, the date the transformer exits all futures positions, and May 3rd would be
t=0 to make the hedging horizon three weeks.
This paper elects not to roll hedges into the next month if a given date’s hedging timeline
coincides with the expiration of natural gas contracts and instead moves the active month to the
month following the prompt. A common strategy used by hedgers and traders alike is to roll their
futures position into the next month at the expiration date. Instead of completely exiting their
futures position, the trader or hedger would exit their positions in the prompt month and convert

Hofstadter21
them to the same position in the active month. In comparison, if the expiration of the prompt
month’s contract occurs during the hedging horizon, this paper switches trading to the following
month to avoid having to roll the contracts. Recent literature suggests the practice of automatically
rolling a series of futures “creates a saw-tooth pattern in the basis,” a driving factor in this paper’s
decision avoid the rollover strategy when collecting price data (Nguyen et al., 2017).
Comparing Hedging Strategies Using LPM 2
In order to more accurately portray the risk profile of transformers, this paper uses LPM 2
as a measurement for hedging effectiveness. As described in the literature review of efficient
hedging, LPM 2 better reflects the hedging preferences of transformers as it only penalizes
downside deviations from a reference level while minimum variance penalizes upside and
downside deviations equally. In other words, LPM 2 would not penalize a hedging strategy that
resulted in a larger profit for transformers than they would have earned without hedging, while
minimum variance would. LPM 2 is defined as:
𝑋𝑋�

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿2 = � (𝑋𝑋� − 𝑋𝑋)2 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑋𝑋)
−∞

(7)

Where X is a random variable of interest, 𝑋𝑋� is a chosen reference level, and F(X) is the cumulative

distribution function of the random variable of interest X. This paper uses the profit earned by a
given hedging strategy as X and the average profit earned by a transformer without hedging during
the period of observation as the reference level 𝑋𝑋�. By using average profit earned by a transformer
without hedging as the reference level, this paper’s LPM 2 calculation only penalizes hedges that

earn a profit below the average profit without hedging.
In order to actually calculate LPM 2 for a hedging strategy, a given hedging strategy’s
profits over the period of observation will be plotted in a histogram. The next step involves

Hofstadter22
calculating the function within the above integral for each bin in the histogram below the reference
level. From there, the Riemann sum will be calculated from the tail of the cumulative distribution
function to the reference level. The Riemann sums will be weighted to account for the size of each
bin relative to the total observed trading days. The solution to this integration gives the LPM 2
statistic for the hedging strategy in question and serves as the basis for comparing each strategy’s
effectiveness given the transformer’s risk profile.

HYPOTHESIS

Drawing on prior research cited in the literature review above and knowledge of the process
of natural gas liquefication, this paper’s initial hypothesis states the naïve hedge will be the most
effective proposed hedging strategy because it most closely mirrors actual inputs and outputs
transformers face. A hedge ratio of 1:1 reflects the relatively small quantities of impurities
removed from natural gas prior to the liquefication process, regardless of the grade of natural gas
used as feedstock by the transformer.

RESULTS

This paper relies on one year of trading data from May 2017 to May 2018. After accounting
for limited LNG daily spot price data points available from the SLING (roughly two data points
per five trading days) and the removal of data points in which the hedge start or end date falls on
a trading holiday, this study contains 87 observations per trading strategy. In calculating LPM 2
this paper uses bin widths of $0.10 for the construction of histograms of realized profits for each
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of the hedging strategy. The midpoint rule is utilized when calculating the Riemann sum to
determine LPM 2 .
No Hedging
Profit earned without any hedging strategy contains 93 observations, more than each
hedging strategy due to the availability of spot price data on trading holidays in which futures
prices are unavailable. Exhibit 1 displays the profit earned by transformers that do not implement
a hedging strategy.
Exhibit 1: Profit Earned without Hedging
Profit from h0 ($ per MMBtu)
$9.00
$8.00
$7.00
$6.00
$5.00
$4.00
$3.00
$2.00
$1.00
$0.00
5/4

6/4

7/4

8/4

9/4 10/4 11/4 12/4 1/4

2/4 3/4

4/4

The average profit earned without hedging is $5.21 per MMBtu, which will serve as the reference
level when calculating LPM 2 . The LPM 2 was calculated for the no hedging strategy in the same
manner as all hedging strategies. The LPM 2 of the transformer that does not hedge is 0.1757. 44
of the 93 observations resulted in a profit below the reference level. The LPM 2 of the no hedging
strategy will serve as the benchmark for the other hedging strategies.
Naïve Hedging Strategy
The average profit earned using the naïve hedging strategy is $4.93 per MMBtu. Exhibit 2
displays the profit earned by transformers that implement the naïve hedging strategy and Exhibit
3 displays the profit earned above or below a no hedging strategy over the period of observation.
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Exhibit 2: Profit earned with the Naïve Hedging Strategy
Profit from hn ($ per MMBtu)
$10.00
$8.00
$6.00
$4.00
$2.00
$0.00
6/15 7/15 8/15 9/15 10/15 11/15 12/15 1/15 2/15 3/15 4/15

Exhibit 3: Naïve Hedging Profit Above the No Hedging Strategy
hn Profit Above No Hedging ($/MMBtu)
$3.00
$2.00
$1.00
$0.00
-$1.00
-$2.00
-$3.00
6/15 7/15 8/15 9/15 10/15 11/15 12/15 1/15 2/15 3/15 4/15

Using bin widths of $0.10 in calculating the weighted Riemann sum leads to the creation of 27
unique bins. The LPM 2 of the naïve hedging strategy is 0.2277. 48 of the 87 observations resulted
in a profit below the reference level.
NGL Hedging Strategy
The average profit earned using the NGL hedging strategy is $3.28 per MMBtu. Exhibit 4
displays the profit earned by transformers that implement the NGL hedging strategy and Exhibit
5 displays the profit earned above or below a no hedging strategy over the period of observation.
Exhibit 4: Profit earned with the NGL Hedging Strategy
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Profit from hNGL ($ per MMBtu)
$6.00
$5.00
$4.00
$3.00
$2.00
$1.00
$0.00
6/15 7/15 8/15 9/15 10/15 11/15 12/15 1/15 2/15 3/15 4/15

Exhibit 5: NGL Hedging Profit Above the No Hedging Strategy
hNGL Profit Above No Hedging ($/MMBtu)
$1.00
$0.00
-$1.00
-$2.00
-$3.00
-$4.00
-$5.00
-$6.00
-$7.00
6/15 7/15 8/15 9/15 10/15 11/15 12/15 1/15 2/15 3/15 4/15

Using bin widths of $0.10 in calculating the weighted Riemann sum leads to the creation of 29
unique bins. The LPM 2 of the naïve hedging strategy is 0.4401. 72 of the 87 observations resulted
in a profit below the reference level.
Power Hedging Strategy
The average profit earned using the power hedging strategy is $4.74 per MMBtu. Exhibit
6 displays the profit earned by transformers that implement the power hedging strategy and Exhibit
7 displays the profit earned above or below a no hedging strategy.
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Exhibit 6: Profit earned with the Power Hedging Strategy
Profit from hPOW ($ per MMBtu)
$10.00
$8.00
$6.00
$4.00
$2.00
$0.00
6/15 7/15 8/15 9/15 10/15 11/15 12/15 1/15 2/15 3/15 4/15

Exhibit 7: Profit Above or Below the No Hedging Strategy
hPOW Profit Above No Hedging ($/MMBtu)
$3.00
$2.00
$1.00
$0.00
-$1.00
-$2.00
-$3.00
6/15 7/15

8/15

9/15 10/15 11/15 12/15 1/15

2/15 3/15

4/15

Using bin widths of $0.10 in calculating the weighted Riemann sum leads to the creation of 29
unique bins. The LPM 2 of the power hedging strategy is 0.2638. 52 of the 87 observations resulted
in a profit below the reference level. A comparison of the results is summarized in Exhibit 8.
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Exhibit 8: Comparison of Hedging Strategies
No Hedge

Naïve Hedge NGL Hedge

Power Hedge

Average Profit

$5.21

$4.93

$3.28

$4.74

Max

$8.38

$9.05

$5.48

$8.89

Min

$2.30

$2.00

$1.31

$1.83

Standard Deviation

1.88

1.95

1.37

1.93

�
Observations Below 𝐗𝐗

47.3%

55.2%

90.1%

59.8%

0.1757

0.2276

0.5622

0.2638

LPM 2

DISCUSSION

The results show that transformers are better off if they do not implement any hedging
strategy than they would be if they implemented any of the proposed strategies. These results are
consistent with market conditions and this paper’s use of LPM 2 as a measurement for hedging
effectiveness, as discussed below.
Analysis of Hedging Strategies
The relatively mediocre performance of the proposed hedging strategies can be explained
in part by market conditions. Exhibit 9 plots the value of the cool spread during the period of
observation, clearly showing its expansion in the past year.
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Exhibit 9: Cool Spread Value in Observation Period
Cool Spread ($ per MMBtu)
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Given these market conditions, it is logical that transformers who did not insulate themselves from
cool spread volatility would realize more profits than those who did as their operating margins
increase alongside the cool spread. This is further compounded by the paper’s use of LPM 2 as a
proxy for hedging effectiveness as it only penalizes downside deviations. This was particularly
severe in the fall of 2017, when the cool spread sustained an extended rally. Only when the cool
spread began to contract in the spring of 2018 did hedging strategies begin to outperform the no
hedging strategy.
The power hedge’s LPM 2 statistic was comparable to naïve hedge, a result consistent with
expectations. Given natural gas and electricity prices are highly correlated, the use of a power
futures contract in a hedging bundle should not have produced results significantly different from
a hedging bundle without it. However, in market conditions in which natural gas prices and
electricity prices experience decoupling, this strategy could have use for transformers.
The NGL hedge’s poor performance relative to the other hedging strategies is also expected
given current market conditions. Ethane and propane prices are at historic lows, something that
cannot be said about LNG. As a result, transformers who separate NGLs from wet gas would be
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creating an unfavorable product mix. By separating out ethane and propane, transformers would
be reducing the quantity of LNG they can produce from the feedstock in order to produce the lower
margin ethane and propane. While such a hedging strategy could be used for wet natural gas
producers, obviously without the LNG component, it is not relevant for this paper. Transformers
who use wet gas as a feedstock would elect to convert the entire quantity to LNG and thus this
strategy does not reflect their economic realities.
Limitations
While this paper faces a number of limitations, none are so great as the availability of price
data and the state of the LNG market. As discussed in the data section above, historical price data
for a number of commodities and futures contracts critical to designing various hedging strategies
is not publicly available or is updated infrequently. For example, global LNG spot prices are not
publicly available, forcing this study to rely on the SLING index as a proxy for LNG spot prices.
The same can be said for ICE’s LNG futures contracts. Another issue inherit in the data is the
frequency in which the prices of key commodities and futures are updated. Ethane, propane, and
Louisiana MISO prices (spot and future) are often stale, reflecting the fact these commodities are
infrequently traded. If the aforementioned commodities were traded in high volumes, in theory the
hedging strategies this paper compares may effectively hedge the cool spread. However, in practice
this is not the case.
Even if relevant price data was available for all the spot and futures prices of the
commodities discussed, the hedging ratios and strategies would need to be adjusted substantially
to reflect the position of each transformer. The variance in global LNG spot prices is much greater
than in other comparable energy sources. For example, LNG exported to Japan from the U.S. in
February 2018 was quoted at $7.46 per MMBtu while the equivalent price for export to Turkey
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was quoted at $4.34. While there is variance in other global energy benchmarks (i.e. WTI versus
Brent for crude oil), such price discrepancies are not nearly as pronounced. Transformers would
also need to adjust their hedging strategy to reflect the composition of their natural gas feedstock
(wet or dry) to determine whether to hedge price fluctuations in NGLs.
Another limitation of this paper due to insufficient price data corresponds to the relative
infancy of the ICE LNG futures contract. Because the ICE’s LNG futures contract began trading
in May of 2017, there are a limited number of possible data points. While NYMEX has listed an
LNG futures contract since 2009, open interest and trading volume has been close to zero
throughout its history. Only since ICE LNG futures officially begin trading did volumes pick up
(ICE cleared 9,000 LNG contracts in January; NYMEX cleared 256), providing fresher price data.
Because historical data is so limited it opens the data to idiosyncrasies that may have been avoided
with more observations. Apart from some sharp contractions in the winter, the cool spread
underwent dramatic expansion during the period of observation. Naturally in periods of cool
spread expansion hedging will cut into transformers’ profits and these strategized will be penalized
in LPM 2 calculations.
Aside from limited price data on relevant commodities and their derivatives, there exists
little data on LNG processing time. While there is an abundance of data regarding the refining
timeline for crude oil, no such timeline exists for LNG, a figure critical for determining a hedging
horizon. Similarly, transformers such as Cheniere do not disclose the quantity of natural gas
feedstock they purchase nor, do they discuss relevant capacity constraints at their export terminals
(Cheniere, 2018). Thus, this paper cannot make an accurate assumption regarding how long natural
gas feedstock is stored at an export terminal before it undergoes liquefication. This is another
critical consideration for determining the hedging horizon that is an unknown.
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Future Considerations
Using the framework outlined in this paper, future research should consider the use of crude
oil prices, spot and future, in designing new hedging strategies. Asian LNG spot prices are
benchmarked to the crude oil, thus dependent on the price of oil. However, future studies will need
access to more comprehensive data to determine an appropriate hedge ratio for a bundle of futures
that includes crude oil. The data necessary, in addition to all relevant future and spot price, will be
access to the methodology as to how Asian LNG futures prices are calculated using crude oil.
Another consideration will to use hedging ratios as outlined by Liu et al. (2016) when
calculating the profit of each strategy. Instead of comparing strategies that utilize fixed hedging
ratios, such as this paper does, researches should consider calculating the optimal hedge ratio
defined as:
∗

�
𝜋𝜋

ℎ = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 min � [𝜋𝜋� − 𝜋𝜋(ℎ)]2 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝜋𝜋(ℎ))
ℎ

−∞

(8)

Liu et al. (2016) find utilizing dynamic instead of fixed ratios increases hedging effectiveness in
times of both high and low volatility in prices of the underlying commodity. This method is beyond
the scope of this paper but an important consideration for future researchers.

CONCLUSION

While the results of this paper show no benefit to transformers in implementing any of the
proposed hedging strategies, the value can be found in the framework. If the forecasted growth of
LNG materializes, more data regarding spot prices will become publicly available and LNG
futures will trade in higher volumes. In addition, to more accurate pricing data, future studies will
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be able to take advantage of more data points that will give a more accurate picture of cool spread
behavior. However, a number of uncertainties loom over LNG’s future. The geopolitical situation
in Russia, potential export regulations in the U.S., and a slow in the development of liquification
technology are all situations that could have a profound impact on the LNG market in the near
future. In summary, this paper does not answer the overarching question of how transformers can
most efficiently hedge the cool spread. However, the paper’s discussion of LNG market dynamics,
hedging strategy design, and LPM 2 as a measure for efficient hedging may inform future studies
of the cool spread.
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APPENDIX

Appendix A: Natural Gas Liquids Hedge Ratio Calculations
Given:
• 28,814 billion cubic feet of wet natural gas production in the U.S. in 2017 (EIA, 2018)
• 2.61 million barrels of ethane and propane produced per day by gas plant production in
2017 (EIA, 2018)
• 0.0011 MMBtu per cubic foot of natural gas
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 952,650,000 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 30,246.2 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 3

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 =
1/(952,650,000 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 30246.2 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 3 × 0.0011 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 3) × 42 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 = 1.26

𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 1.26 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 × 0.1 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = 0.13

Thus:

𝜋𝜋(ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) =

3 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
3
16 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
16 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝑆𝑆1 +
𝑆𝑆1 + 𝑆𝑆1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝑆𝑆0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + (𝐹𝐹1𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 − 𝐹𝐹0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) +
(𝐹𝐹
− 𝐹𝐹1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 )
20
20
20
20 0
+

3
3
(𝐹𝐹0𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 − 𝐹𝐹1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ) + (𝐹𝐹0𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 − 𝐹𝐹1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 )
20
20

Assumption:
• Only ethane and propane production are considered given these two NGLs make up the
vast majority of total NGL production (DOE, 2017)
• Wet natural gas composition ≈ 80% methane, 20% NGLs (NAESB, 2003)
• Ethane and propane are produced in equal parts, when in reality ethane makes up 54% of
total ethane and propane production (DOE, 2017)
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Appendix B: Hedging Horizon Calendar
Prompt Month

Trading Abbreviation

Start Date

End Date

July 2017

N7

May 4, 2017

June 2, 2017

August 2017

Q7

June 5, 2017

July 3, 2017

September 2017

U7

July 5, 2017

August 3, 2017

October 2017

V7

August 4, 2017

September 1, 2017

November 2017

X7

September 4, 2017

October 3, 2017

December 2017

Z7

October 4, 2017

November 1, 2017

January 2018

F8

November 2, 2017

November 30, 2017

February 2018

G8

December 1, 2017

January 3, 2018

March 2018

H8

January 4, 2018

January 31, 2018

April 2018

J8

February 1, 2017

March 2, 2018

May 2018

K8

March 5, 2017

April 2, 2018

June 2018

M8

April 3, 2017

May 2, 2018
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